This paper discusses recent steps China has taken to open its capital account and presents empirical evidence on asset market linkages between China and Asia. We find only weak crosscountry linkages in longer-term interest rates, but much stronger linkages in equity markets. Moreover, we find that the strength of the correlation of equity prices changes between China and other Asia countries increased markedly during the global financial crisis and has remained high in recent years.
Introduction
China's pace of real economic growth and transformation into a global trading power over the past three decades has been unprecedented. However, development of its financial sector has been more gradual and irregular. Despite evident progress in the size and depth of the financial sector, state-controlled banks and institutions dominate financial markets, many asset prices are heavily managed, and a myriad of regulations and controls still affect international financial transactions. This uneven pattern of development raises the question of whether liberalization of China's financial sector and the "internationalization" of its currency, the renminbi, will ever catch up with the real side of the economy, allowing China to stand among other major economic powers as a world financial center.
"Internationalization" of a currency generally involves permitting its use by domestic and foreign agents in international trade and financial transactions both inside and outside of a country's borders. Full internationalization of the renminbi (rmb) is a tall order for a country that currently maintains numerous financial controls and heavily regulates domestic and cross-border financial transactions. Nonetheless, Chinese leaders have made concerted efforts to encourage greater international use of the rmb since the G-20 summit in November 2008 when Chinese President Hu Jintao called for "a new international financial order that is fair, just, inclusive, and orderly," and China subsequently began to encourage more use of its currency in international trade, swap arrangements between central banks, and bank deposits and bond issuances in Hong Kong.
1 Though Prasad and Ye (2012a) view the effects of these efforts on use of the rmb as modest in size so far, they regard them as symbolically important in signaling the shift in China's ambitions for the renminbi's future role in the global economy and international monetary system.
Views about the prospects for internationalization of the rmb vary. Some analysts (Ito, 2011) argue that an rmb currency bloc will soon emerge in Asia within which the rmb would be used widely as a transactions currency for trade and finance as well as treated as a reserve currency by other central banks. Other analysts predict a more gradual and slower pace for internationalization of the rmb in regional and global transactions. McCauley (2011) , for example, maintains that the Chinese authorities have only just begun the process of permitting the rmb to become an international currency, in terms of allowing residents and non-residents alike to use the currency to trade, invest, borrow, and invoice outside of China. Prasad and Ye (2012b) analyze the growing internationalization of the rmb through its use in the denomination and settlement of cross-border trade and financial transactions, the likelihood and timing of its convertibility, and the prospects for its greater utilization as a reserve currency. They also describe how rmb trade settlement in Hong Kong has expanded rapidly, the issuance of renminbi-denominated bonds both in Hong Kong and the Mainland is picking up, and signs that some central banks are holding rmb-denominated assets in their foreign exchange reserve portfolios. Nonetheless, they conclude that while internationalization of the rmb is steadily growing, it is a long way from attaining full convertibility or meeting other prerequisites for achieving reserve currency status.
Still others see relatively little internationalization of the rmb to date and are pessimistic about further developments, as it would undermine China's highly managed financial and monetary system. In this view, rmb internationalization cannot be undertaken without domestic financial reforms that more closely link the domestic financial system as well as domestic monetary and exchange rate policies to the international financial system.
A large body of literature has addressed various aspects of the policy challenges faced by China as it seeks to sequence capital-account opening and currency internationalization with other policies, such as exchange-rate flexibility and financial market development (Glick and Hutchison, 2009) . Less well discussed is how the gradual process of financial liberalization and the China's drive toward internationalization of the rmb has affected its Asian neighbors. Given the sheer size and dynamism of China's economy, greater financial openness and internationalization of the rmb inevitably will have repercussions for the global economy and, of course, even more so for its regional trade and financial partners in Asia.
Capital Control Liberalization in China
China has pursued a cautious path towards greater financial openness. Although tax benefits and other incentives have been used to promote inward foreign direct investment, other forms of inflows, particularly portfolio capital and external debt, have been traditionally discouraged. Capital controls have also played a role in protecting the banking system from external competition by restricting the entry of foreign banks and by making it harder for capital to flow out of the country.
As China slowly liberalizes its capital account, it faces a key challenge of maintaining domestic monetary and price stability. 2 Large balance of payments surpluses through both the current and financial accounts have put upward pressure on the currency. To limit appreciation of the renminbi, Chinese monetary authorities have intervened in the foreign exchange market and accumulated massive amounts of foreign reserve. As a result, China's holdings of foreign reserves have risen from $140 billion in 1997 to over $3.2 trillion at the end of 2011.
2 For example, China in recent years has permitted limited expansion of portfolio capital flows through "qualified investment" programs. Moreover, unofficial flows into and out of China have grown over time.
This reserve buildup has raised concerns about monetary and inflation stability in China, as both money aggregates and prices have grown faster. A not-so-distant memory is the excessive expansion of the monetary base, money, and credit between 1991 and 1994 -when these aggregates grew at times by over 40 percent per annum --resulting in high inflation, with CPI rising near 30 percent at its peak. 3 The foreign reserve boom over the past decade has similarly led to periods of very large increases in the monetary base, threatening at times a return of higher inflation (Glick and Hutchison, 2009 In recent years, China has liberalized controls on non-FDI capital flows very slowly.
Authorized banks were allowed to transact cross-border to accommodate onshore non-bank depositors and borrowers wishing to deposit and borrow in foreign currency. China has sought to institutionalize the management of two-way portfolio flows through programs for so-called "qualified foreign institutional investors" (QFIIs) for portfolio inflows and "qualified domestic institutional investors" (QDIIs) for portfolio outflows. 6 Both programs involve pre-approval procedures, quota management, foreign exchange conversion rules, instrument restrictions, and intensive reporting requirements. With the introduction of the QDII plan in 2006, China opened an official channel for Chinese households and firms to gain access to global financial markets.
Appreciation pressures on the rmb have led China to encourage outflows through other channels, for example, by relaxing restrictions on currency conversion by domestic residents. 7 In addition, firms and banks have been given flexibility to issue foreign-exchange denominated bonds in local markets and to raise their direct overseas investment.
Though China had tightly controlled portfolio flows and most external debts for a long time, there is evidence that these capital controls were leaky and had tended to become less effective over time even before the recent relaxation of capital controls. 8 The sheer magnitude of net and gross portfolio capital and "hot money" inflows clearly casts doubt on the effectiveness 6 In December 2002, QFIIs were allowed to invest in A shares and other domestic securities, subject to requirements of at least $10 billion in assets under management and prior experience. Repatriation was limited by lock-up periods on stocks of as long as one-year. New rules in September 2006 lowered the asset under management criteria to $5 billion, reduced the lock-up period to three months, lessened experience requirements, and also raised the quotas for investment in Chinese equities. The QDII program, launched in July 2006, permitted qualified commercial banks, securities firms, and insurance companies in China to make limited offshore investments in foreign-currency denominated assets (restricted to fixed income securities in the case of banks and insurance companies). More recently, in response to concerns about increased capital outflows as the economy has slowed, China has accelerated its approval process to allow more capital inflows into its stock and bond markets via the QFII program. 7 In 2007 the PBOC raised to $50 thousand the ceiling on the conversion between rmb and foreign currency by Chinese individuals. 8 Prasad and Wei (2007) provide an extensive chronology of capital controls over the period 1980 -January 2005; Prasad and Ye (2012b) update the chronology to 2011. They document the increasing openness of China's capital account in both de jure and de facto terms through selective and cautious changes, consistent with the active promotion of the rmb as an international currency. However, in most cases, they argue that constraints on capital inflows and outflows have been merely relaxed rather than eliminated entirely.
of China's capital control regime. Moreover, as the evidence presented in Glick and Hutchison (2009) Cheung et al., 2005; Ma and McCauley, 2007; and Otani, Fukomoto, and Tsuyaguchi, 2011; Lee, Huh, and Donghyun 2011, McCauley, 2011; Prasad and Ye, 2012b 
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These results suggest that while China has made strides in terms of achieving a major role for the rmb in international trade through the establishment of rmb settlement mechanisms and swap lines, there is relatively limited evidence of an independent effect of the rmb on the exchange rate policies of neighboring economies. Ma and McCauley (2010) argue that it is important to consider the frequency of the data when analyzing correlations. For example they find that the co-movement of the renminbi with 9 He also examines deviations from uncovered interest parity, with the expected exchange rate change used in these calculations proxied by the previous period's actual change. For a related exercise analyzing real interest linkages among Pacific Basin countries, see Glick and Hutchison (1990) . 10 Quantity-based measures include measurement of openness and restrictiveness in trade and financial transactions, cross-border movement of capital, output and consumption correlations, and savings-investment correlations. They yield similar conclusions; see Jang (2011) . 11 Somewhat ironically they find that the rmb mattered more outside of East Asia, including India and Pakistan, as well as many countries in Africa.
major currencies other than the dollar is greater at lower frequency, i.e. at weekly or monthly intervals rather than at a daily frequency.
China and Asian Financial Linkages and Global and Country Financial Turbulence
Our review of the literature on China's capital controls and increasing international financial integration suggests that China's domestic financial development is proceeding slowly 
Basic Linkages
Our objective is to investigate how Asian financial linkages with China have evolved over time and through periods of global and home-market financial turbulence. equities rose very gradually, with Chinese equities rebounding more rapidly. Figure 2b indicates a pattern linking China with other Asia countries not only during the GFC, but after as well. In particular, the world-wide drop in equity markets affected other Asia countries during the GFC period, but in the post-GFC period there was a wide-spread robust upturn in Asia equity markets, suggesting a greater coupling of equity prices in China and other Asian economies.
We confirm these visual impressions with simple correlations of daily changes in Chinese and Asian country bond rates (first differences in percentage points) and equity prices (first differences in logs) for the full sample period and three sub-samples. Correlations of Asian bond 12 The GFC period roughly corresponds to the time span over which China responded to the crisis by halting the appreciation of the rmb against the U.s. dollar.
rates and equity price changes with the U.S. are also presented for purposes of comparison. . U.S. market changes are lagged one day to account for timing differences in market opening and closing across time zones. the perceptible shift in the correlations with China, which were relatively low in the pre-crisis period, but rose markedly during the crisis. This is consistent with the GFC acting as a common financial shock which was transmitted globally. However, the high equity correlations of the GFC period carried over to the post-GFC crisis period (mid 2010 to late 2012), indicating the newfound importance of China's markets may be a permanent institutional feature in equity pricing in Asian.
Figures 3a and 3b illustrate this point with bar charts by showing the correlations for
China and the U.S., respectively, with the eight Asian countries in our sample over the three subsamples. The sharp rise in correlations between China and the Asian region across the three subsamples is clearly evident Figure 3a . By contrast, continuously high equity market correlations across U.S. and Asian equity markets is observed in Figure 3b with no evidence of a systematic increase or decrease before, during, or after the GFC. This finding is consistent with visual inspection of the equity market movements over time presented in Figures 2a and 2b.
Country Regression Analysis
Visual presentations of the data and simple correlations may mask the influence of other variables. In this section, we present regression results of the influence of Chinese asset pricesboth bond interest rates and equity returns --on analogous prices in other Asian countries, while controlling for developments in the U.S. as well as global and country-specific risk. 14 Global risk in the context is proxied by the VIX rate, measuring the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options., and, country-specific risk is proxied \by the credit default swap (CDS) rate on national sovereign debt for those countries where this variable is available (data is unavailable for Singapore, Taiwan, and India). We abstract from other possible determinants, such as exchange rate policy and capital controls in other countries. As in our correlation analysis, bond rate changes are expressed as first differences of the daily rate levels, while equity returns are expressed as logged first differences of daily price levels, with U.S. markets lagged one day to account for timing differences in market opening and closing across time zones.
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The question investigated then is, after controlling for the common shock of U.S.
financial market movements, global risk, and country-specific risk, to what extent are changes in China's asset prices transmitted to other Asian countries? And, how has the strength of transmission/linkage changed with the advent of the GFC?
Figures 4a and 4b show the movements of the VIX rate (basis points) and countryspecific sovereign CDS spreads (basis points) for the five most important emerging markets in Asia (other than China). It is evident that VIX and CDS spreads moved closely during the GFC 14 We treat U.S. asset price movements as capturing the effects of global shocks on Asian markets. The more recent European crisis might be regarded as another global shock. 15 We do not report the effects of including any additional lags of the dependent or explanatory variables in our analysis, since doing so did not affect results.
but in other periods there is considerable "decoupling," indicating that idiosyncratic country-risk characteristics are important. In Table 3a , observe that the Chinese bond interest rate coefficients are statistically significant in only one of eight cases in the pre-and post-GFC samples (Taiwan in the pre-GFC period and Korea in the post-GFC period, , while in the GFC sample there are three significant cases (for Indonesia, Korea, and Singapore, though the coefficient is statistically negative in the latter case). Tables 2b and 2c indicate that this pattern of a limited association of China and Asian bond rate changes is robust to the inclusion of additional controls. By contrast, U.S. bond rate changes are positively and significantly correlated with other Asian countries in almost every case and specification. The VIX is statistically significant and positive during the pre-and post-GFC periods but, surprisingly, not generally significant during the GFC period. Countryspecific risk, as modeled by the CDS spread, is only occasionally significant as a determinant of bond interest rates.
Turning to equity price change regressions, the results in Table 3a , 3b, and 3c are consistent with the correlation analysis in finding a large and robust association of Chinese equity price changes with other Asian countries during all sub-samples and formulations. The pattern across the three sub-periods is also remarkably consistent-the importance of Chinese equity price transmission evidently grew during the GFC and remained at a much higher level (compared to the first sub-sample) for all eight countries in every formulation of the model except one instance (out of 24 regressions reported in Tables 3a, 3b , and 3c). The rise in the Chinese connection to Asian markets is clearly illustrated in Figure 5 , which reports the eight coefficient estimates in the pre-and post-GFC periods from Table 3b , which includes the Vix rate, but not the CDS rate, so that results for all countries may be reported. (Note that for
Singapore and Thailand the coefficients were virtually zero in the pre-GFC period and display as missing bars in the chart.).
U.S. equity returns are also significant in almost every case, and usually much higher in magnitude than the corresponding China transmission effect, though there is evidence that it has declined in importance over time. Although the VIX is an important determinant of equity prices changes in several cases, CDS spreads have much more pronounced effects on national equity price changes in Asian countries.
We also consider another measure of financial transmission that may not be captured by movements in Chinese equity prices-changes in Chinese reserve requirement changes. Table 4 shows the response of Asian equity prices to dummy variables for days of increases (China RR incr) and decreases (China RR decr) in reserve requirements on banks set by the People's Bank of China (PBOC), one its operating instruments of monetary policy. 16 The expected effect of these announcements is unclear. On the one hand, we would expect loosening (tightening) of monetary policy and credit in China, captured by decreases (increases) in reserve requirements, to strengthen (weaken) equity prices elsewhere in Asia. On the other hand, the announcements of loosening may also have a signaling effect of how weak is the Chinese economy, implying a negative effect on other its trading partners.
In fact, in the post-GFC period we do find that China's reserve rate decreases had a negative effect on equity prices in four of five countries, though this effect is significant for only two countries (Singapore, Taiwan, and India are excluded because of the lack of data on the CDS rate, included as a control variable). However, on balance, these results are quite mixed and do not show a discernible pattern, either in terms of the sign of the effector significance across countries or sub-sample periods. Hence, it does not appear that substantial and rising equity market linkages between China and its Asian neighbors are attributable to monetary policy actions in China.
Panel Regressions: Direct tests of Financial Turbulence and Transmission
To further explore how financial turbulence-global and idiosyncratic-has influenced the transmission of Chinese bond and equity prices to other Asian countries, we consider several panel regressions, reported in Tables 5, 6, and 7 for bond interest rates and Tables 8, 9 , and 10 for equity returns. Table 5 reports panel regressions of the "baseline" bond rate model in the first column (with U.S. and Chinese bond rates included) and subsequently adding the VIX and CDS spreads to the regressions reported in the second and third columns, respectively. Again, we consider the full sample and three sub-samples. Tables 6 and 7 also report bond rate regressions that add, respectively, VIX and CDS terms interacting with the Chinese bond rates. This allows us to test whether the strength of transmission of Chinese bond rate changes across Asia is influenced by global or idiosyncratic risk.
Although not strong, the transmission of Chinese bond interest rate changes across Asia is more evident in Table 5 than in the individual country regressions in Tables 2a, 2b , and 2c.
The strength of the transmission mechanism appears fairly consistent between the two tranquil periods (pre-and post-GFC) but appears to weaken during the GFC period. Moreover, the strength of the transmission does not appear to increase when either global risk (proxied by VIX, reported in Table 6 ) or local idiosyncratic risk (proxied by CDS, reported in Table 7) rises. That is, the interactive effects between China asset price fluctuations and the risk measures are generally insignificant. Table 8 reports the baseline regression results for equity price changes. These results are very similar to the individual country regressions in Tables 3a, 3b , and 3c: the transmission of Chinese interest rates rose markedly during the GFC and has remained high through the end of the sample. This result is robust to the inclusion of the VIX and CDS as control variables. In addition, the strength of transmission of U.S. equity prices to Asian countries declined sharply during the GFC and appears to have remained at this new level. Again, these results are consistent with our earlier findings.
The main result in this section-that the strength of transmission of Chinese equity prices across Asia has increased markedly during the GFC and remained strong-proves to be very robust across specifications of the model and holds also in the extended panel regressions where interactive terms are included (Tables 9 and 10 ). In addition, the VIX interaction terms (Table 9) indicate that higher global risk increases the strength of the transmission mechanism for Chinese equities across Asia during the GFC and post-GFC periods, but not during the tranquil period prior to the GFC. That is, our results imply that a higher VIX, associated with greater global turbulence translates into a stronger transmission across Asia of a given equity price change in
China. This result holds during the GFC and afterwards. By contrast, country-specific risk measured by CDS spreads does not appear to influence the strength of the transmission mechanism during the GFC, but does so during the pre-and post-GFC periods and in the direction again of increasing the strength of the transmission effect. This is shown in Table 10 .
The interactive term is not statistically significant during the GFC, but in the early and late subsample periods, the main result holds-China is playing an increasing important role in determining equity prices in the region and the strength of this linkage increases during periods of global or national financial turbulence.
Conclusion
This paper evaluates how changes in China's financial system, liberalization of capital controls and the process of financial "internationalization" have affected financial markets in other Asian economies. In particular, we examine how financial market changes in China's economy-whether driven by policy changes, market-driven developments, institutional changes, or the growing importance in the region-have influenced financial asset prices of its Asian neighbors.
Our main conclusion is that domestic financial development in China as of late 2012 have been modest and internationalization of the currency and liberalization of capital controls has been very limited. Consequently, substantial divergences remain between interest rates in China and its neighbors. In particular, only weak linkages were detected in longer-term interest rates (five-year bond rates). The strongest linkages appear in equity markets. We argue that equity market arbitrage working through capital markets was not the force driving these linkages between China and Asia. Rather, the emergence of China as the clear regional economic power, the sheer size and dynamism of its economic activity and trading relationships, have played the dominant role in linking equity markets across the region.
Moreover, we find that the strength of the transmission of equity prices changes from China across Asia increased markedly during the GFC and have stayed at this heighter level in recent years. By contrast, the strength of equity price linkages between the U.S. and Asia economies decreased during the GFC and remains lower at present. Rising global uncertainty, measured by the VIX, appears to increase the importance of China in transmitting equity price changes abroad. When country-specific idiosyncratic risk (measured by CDS spreads) increases, the transmission of Chinese equity price shocks to other Asian countries also appears to rise.
China's role in the region is increasing, and seems to rise further during periods of global or country-specific uncertainty. Note: all variables are in first differences. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at 1, 5, 10% indicated by ***,**,* 10% indicated by ***,**,* Note: All variables are in first differences. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at 1, 5, 10% indicated by ***,**,* Note: Equity prices are in logged first differences. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at 1, 5, 10% indicated by ***,**,* Note: Equity prices are in logged first differences; other variables are in differences. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at 1, 5, 10% indicated by ***,**,* Note: Panel regression in last column has fixed effects, errors clustered by country. Singapore, Taiwan, and India are dropped from the panel because of N/A data on CDS rates. Note: Panel regression with fixed effects, errors clustered by country. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. Singapore, Taiwan, and India are dropped from regression (3) because of N/A data on CDS rates. Note: Panel regression with fixed effects, errors clustered by country. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. Singapore, Taiwan, and India are dropped from regression (3) because of N/A data on CDS rates. 
